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Editorial
The microbial threat in fragile times: balancing known
and unknown risks
David L. Heymann1
The infrastructures that protect public health
on a daily basis go mostly unnoticed until
diseases become a threat. News of E. coli in
the water supply, BSE agent in the food chain
or anthrax in the postal system puts the
spotlight on the public health system and
raises important questions about its ability
to keep the public safe.
Microbes proliferate rapidly, mutate
frequently, and adapt easily to new environ-
ments and hosts. Numerous factors, including
human activities, can accelerate and amplify
these natural phenomena (1). As a result,
pathogens that are new to humans are being
identified with disturbing frequency. Epidemic-
prone diseases such as dengue, yellow
fever and meningococcal meningitis have
become resurgent, sometimes in more viru-
lent forms. Control of TB andmalaria through
standard measures is eroded by antimicrobial
resistance. Diseases such as West Nile fever
and Rift Valley fever have spread to new
continents and become endemic there. Influ-
enza — one of the most mutable viruses —
demands regular worldwide surveillance to
predict which strains are required for vaccine,
and to detect the next antigenic shift that
could launch a global pandemic.
In recent years, unusual epidemics as
well as new diseases have occurred on every
continent. Some of the more spectacular
recent outbreaks in industrialized countries
have been due to changes in the behaviour of
a pathogen that allowed it to circumvent the
defences of public health. Examples include
E. coli serotype O157:H7 thriving in highly
acidic foods and beverages such as mayon-
naise and cider, and BSE agent surviving
all conventional deactivation procedures.
It is in the developing countries, how-
ever, that new diseases and outbreaks occur
most often. It is there too that the laboratory
and surveillance capacity to detect and contain
these diseases is sometimes lacking. In many
parts of the developing world people face
biological terror on a permanent basis in the
form of diseases such as cholera, dengue,
measles, meningitis, shigellosis, and yellow
fever. Though Ebola gets spectacular
publicity whenever it occurs, it is these
more common diseases, as well as AIDS,
that can and do cause most devastation
in the form of death, disability and economic
loss.
Beginning with the 1992 publication
of the US Institute of Medicine’s landmark
report on emerging infections, the resurgence
of infectious diseases has been viewed as
a factor that can undermine national and
international security (2). AIDS in particular
convinced the world that a previously
unknown pathogen could destabilize whole
regions. The highly publicized emergence
of new diseases and re-emergence of others,
combined with the increased speed and
volume of international travel, have made
countries aware of their vulnerability.
With the use of anthrax to incite terror,
a range of new issues arises within an already
complex mix of competing priorities and
uncertainties. In uniting against the infectious
disease threat, how much priority should the
international community give to an unknown
yet potentially catastrophic risk, such as the
deliberate release of smallpox, when over
14 million people continue to die each year
from well-known and often preventable
infectious diseases? What priority should be
given to the stockpiling of vaccines and drugs
against a possible bioterrorist attack when
so many millions of preventable deaths are
attributed to lack of access to essential drugs?
Since 11 September 2001, WHO has
often been asked about how to respond to
a bioterrorist attack. The answer is that the
epidemiological and laboratory techniques
needed to detect and contain an outbreak are
the same whether that outbreak is deliberately
caused or natural. Adequate data on the
prevalence of natural background diseases
make it much easier to recognize an unusual
and possibly deliberately caused disease.
The ‘‘invisible’’ infrastructure for global
disease surveillance and response exists and
is firmly in place. It is the Global Outbreak
Alert and Response Network (GOARN),
formally inaugurated by WHO in April 2001.
A ‘‘network of networks’’, GOARN inter-
links, in real time, over 100 existing networks
which together possess much of the data,
expertise and skills needed to keep the
international community constantly alert to
outbreaks—whatever the cause— and ready
to respond. The network, which operates
within the framework of the International
Health Regulations, is supported by a com-
puterized system for gathering disease intelli-
gence, and makes full use of the power of
electronic communications (3).
Between July 1998 and August 2001,
WHO verified 578 outbreaks of potential
international importance in 132 countries, and
investigated many hundreds more. Twenty-
two countries, many affected by complex
emergencies, had 10 or more verified epi-
demics. The most common natural outbreaks
were of cholera, meningitis, haemorrhagic
fevers, viral encephalitis, and anthrax (3).
Theworld faces the prospect of surprises
arising from the volatile microbial world on
a daily basis. The threats posed by infectious
diseases have global causes and effects that
can only be managed with global partnerships
supported by strong national public health
capacity. Foreign policy agendas which aim at
building a more secure world are therefore
increasingly including infectious disease
prevention and control. As stated in Novem-
ber 2001 in theOttawa Plan for Improving Health
Security, strengthened global capacity for
routine disease surveillance and response is
an essential component of preparedness for a
possible attack using biological weapons (4).
This approach is seen as a wise ‘‘dual use’’
investment which prepares for a potential
security threat while at the same time yielding
a clear benefit for public health.
Such advice rings especially true for an
ever more interconnected world. Whether
outbreaks are caused naturally or deliberately,
and whether they start in developing or
industrialized countries, every country is
vulnerable to them. When the world
strengthens its defences against known
disease threats it can only be better protected
against those that are unknown as well. n
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